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In the United States, sociological legal scholars have long admonished that it is
necessary to understand the distinction between the law on the books and the law in action.
Any discussion of dismissal in the United States must be particularly mindful of this
distinction. In employment, there is a wide disjunction between the law as it is written and
articulated by judges, and the actual practice of labor relations. Further, in the area of
dismissal from employment, both the law on the books and the law in action are in flux at
the present time, both in flux and moving in opposite directions. Let me explain.

I. The At-Will Rule “On the Books”
In the United States, the dominant form of the employment contract is at-will. The
American at-will doctrine says that an employment contract of indefinite duration can be
terminated by either party at any time for any reason. This means employees can quit any
time and their employer can fire them without giving warning and without incurring any
post-employment obligations. The at-will contract lasts only from moment to moment, at
every moment completed and at every moment renewed.1
Because the employment contract has no duration and imposes no obligations
beyond the present moment, one might fairly question whether it is a contract at all. It is a
contract with no duration; there is literally no discernible time period during which the
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1 Not all employment in the United States is at-will. If the parties have a contract of employment for a fixed term, such as a contract to work for one year, then it is not terminable
at will. However, a court finds that such a contract is for an unreasonably long duration, it will treat the contract as at-will. For example, employment contracts that purport to be
of indefinite duration or for lifetime are deemed to be employment at-will.

contract is in effect. At every motion the contract is fully performed and at every moment
there is a new contract.
Not only does the American at-will employment contract have no temporality, it
also has no fixed or on-going terms. At any time an employer can change the terms
prospectively. That is, it can change the wage, terminate benefits, cut back on vacations,
and so on. At least in theory, the American employment relationship does not offer
workers any dismissal protection, severance rights, reasonableness requirements, or even a
reliable wage package unless the employee.2 Hence, under the U.S. at-will rule, employees
are vulnerable to arbitrary and sudden dismissal, intermittent work, on-call employment,
occasional employment, and sudden, unannounced cuts in pay and benefits. Further, the
contract of employment imposes no justiciable right to fair treatment or protection of the
workers’ honor, dignity, or health. Some of those rights have been provided by statute, but
they are not considered an intrinsic part of the employment contract.
In the European context, the American at-will doctrine seems bizarre. It makes
more sense if one sees it in its historical context. The at-will rule had its origin in the late
19th century. Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, most workers in the U.S. were agricultural workers, hired for a specific harvest season.
Under the then-current master-servant regime, those workers were subject to the “entire contract doctrine,” which maintained that workers who quit their

jobs or were dismissed before the end of the term of their employment contract forfeited any wages for the time worked. For example, if a worker was

hired for a year and left after ten months, he would often find himself with no pay for the period worked. Even if the contract was for an unspecified term,

courts would imply a time period, such as a harvest season or a year and thus impose a forfeiture on a worker who left prematurely. Most courts also
imposed a forfeiture on workers who were fired, unless they found the dismissal to be without good cause.3 For unskilled workers, the entire contract

doctrine created considerable income insecurity.

2 There is an exception when an employee is in a union that has a collective bargaining agreement. In that case, the union

contract transforms the
individual employment contract into a relationship governed by the collective bargaining
agreement.
3 For examples, see Karen Orren, BELATED FEUDALISM (1991); Robert Steinfeld, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR (1991).

In the latter half of the 19th century, employment contracts for an indefinite term became commonplace. With the rise of
mass production and the factory system after the Civil War, many rural Americans migrated, and many Europeans immigrated, to American cities to

become factory workers. These workers were hired for indefinite terms and hence did not fit naturally into the entire contract doctrine. Because factory

workers were not hired for a specified term, if they quit – or went on strike – they were not abandoning a contractual obligation that was fixed in time.

Some courts nonetheless attempted to apply the entire contract doctrine and penalize workers who left their jobs, but others took a different tack.

Beginning in the 1880s, a few state courts adopted the view that both parties to an employment contract of indefinite duration could terminate it at any time
for any reason. This was termed the “at-will doctrine,” and it quickly spread from state to state and became the overwhelmingly dominant common law.4
At its inception, the at-will doctrine was beneficial for unskilled workers.5 In particular, the at-will rule mitigated the harshness of the 19th century

entire contract regime. It provided that a worker hired for an indefinite term had the right to be paid for the time worked, up to the moment he quit or was fired. Because the rule made it easier for workers to quit, the at-will rule

gave

unskilled workers a degree of autonomy and freedom they had not theretofore possessed.6
It also gave them income security, at least for the time they worked. What they lost,
however, was employment security, but that was not something they had enjoyed in the
first place.7
II. The At-Will Rule “In Action:” The ‘De-Casualization’ of Labor and the Development
of Internal Labor Markets in the Early Twentieth Century
Soon after the at-will rule became the dominant form of employment contract,
major employers in the U.S. instituted a series of practices that diminished its impact.
Large employers, influenced by the teachings of the scientific management and personnel
management theorists of the early 20th century, began to restructure their work forces into arrangements that
are today termed “internal labor markets.”8 In internal labor markets, jobs were
4 For a discussion of the dissemination of the at-will rule from the Wood Treatise to the state courts, see Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20
Am. J. of Legal History 118 (1976).
5 Although in theory, an at-will employee should have an unfettered right to strike, the common law courts were not willing to be so permissive. They reasoned that while an
individual worker had a right to quit, collective action that harmed the employer was an actionable conspiracy. See e.g., Vegalahn v. Guntner,167 Mass. 92 (1896).

6 For a discussion of the progressive potential of the at-will revolution in employment law, see Karen Orren, BELATED FEUDALISM.
7 See Katherine V.W. Stone, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 13 - 26 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004).
8

See, Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS,
(1971). For a discussion of the history of internal labor markets in American industry, see Katherine

arranged into hierarchical ladders in which each job provided the training for the job on
the next rung up. Employers who utilized internal labor markets hired only at the entry
level, then utilized internal promotion to fill all of the higher rungs. The human resource
policies that accompanied internal labor markets were designed to encourage employee
attachment. Employers wanted employees to stay a long time, so they gave them implicit
promise of long-term employment and of orderly and predictable patterns of promotion.
Consistent with internal labor market job structures, employers structured pay and benefit
systems so that wages and benefits rose as length of service increased.
Those firms that utilized internal labor markets gave employees implicit promises of
job security despite the then-prevailing at-will regime. For reasons that I have explored
elsewhere, by the mid-20th century, most large firms and many mid-sized firms utilized
internal labor markets for the bulk of their workforce.9 Hence for much of the 20th century, the
at-will rule was the de jure employment contract, but an implicit contract for job security and orderly promotional opportunity was the norm for many

American workers. Throughout most of the twentieth century, then, employees in the primary sector enjoyed relatively stable work life experience. This

was due to two mutually reinforcing factors. First, they were the beneficiaries of employers’ implicit promises of job security that induced employees to

keep them on the job even as demand conditions fluctuated. And second, many of them had unions that negotiated contracts with job security provisions
such as just cause for dismissal clauses and protection for senior employees during layoffs. As a result of these factors,

until the early 1980s,

considerably more than half of all male workers over the age of 40 had been on their jobs
for 10 years or more.10
There were, of course, many who did not benefit from the internal labor market job
structures in large manufacturing firms. The employment system provided job security
and relative prosperity to many, but there were many who were left out. Those who

Stone, The Origin of Job Structures in the Steel Industry, in LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION (Richard C.
Edwards, et. al., eds., 1975) 27 - 96.
9 See, Stone, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS, supra. n. 7 at 27 - 63.
10 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004 Employee Tenure Survey, Table 2.

worked in small firms or in sectors that did not utilize internal labor markets were left out,
and locked out, of the primary sector. There thus emerged a dual labor market, comprised
of insiders – usually white, blue collar men in unionized firms – and outsiders – usually
women, minorities, migrant workers and rural Americans. The outsiders remained subject
to the unmediated at-will rule, lacking job security, promotional opportunities, and for the
most part, lacking job-related benefits.11

III. Recent Changes in the Law on the Books
From the 1930s, there have been legislative modifications to the at-will rule. The
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) created a major exception to employers’
rights to dismiss employees at will by making it unlawful to dismiss an employee for union
activity.12 This modification of the common law was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1937
in the landmark case, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.13 Three decades later,
Congress made another inroad into the at-will rule by enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which made it unlawful to dismiss an employee or deny employment on the
basis of race, sex, national origin or religion.14 These exceptions, while important, were
narrow inroads in the doctrine giving employees dismissal protection in only a narrow
range of circumstances.
Then, in the 1970s and 1980s, many states in the United States revised their at-will
doctrines so as to place more general restrictions on employers’ right to fire employees.
Many states adopted a common law tort of unjust dismissal, in which a court imposes tort
liability when an employer discharges an employee for a reason that violates public policy.
11 See Doeringer & Piore, supra., DUAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS.
12 29 U.S.C. §158 (a) (3) (2001).
13 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.

Instances in which courts found an employer liable were when an employer fired an
employee for serving on a jury or for refusing to commit perjury.15 In addition, a small
number of states adopted an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts, thus finding that an employer breached an employment contract by discharging
an employee in a situation that demonstrated egregious bad fath. The prototype situation
in which a court found an employer liable for breaching an implied covenant was when an
employer discharged a salesman just before a large commission on a sale he had completed
became due and payable.16
These two modifications of the at-will doctrine begin to redefine the contract of
employment. Both the tort of unjust dismissal and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing impose on employers obligations that cannot be waived. However, not all states
have adopted either doctrine, so their application has been of a patchwork character. In
many states, courts have limited those exceptions to cases of extremely abusive employer
conduct, so that there have been relatively few cases in which employers were found liable
either for unjust dismissal or breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In the 1980s, courts developed a third type of modification of the at-will doctrine, an
implied-in-fact contract exception. In these cases, courts imposed contractual liability on
employers who engaged in arbitrary dismissals after giving verbal promises of lifetime
employment and fostering a corporate culture that assured its employees that they would
not be fired unfairly.17 For example, in 1984, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
when an employer puts promises of fair treatment and limitations on its powers of
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Foley v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).

See, e.g., Pugh v. See’s Candies, 171 Ca. Rptr. 917 (Ca., Ct. App. 1981), overruled in part on
other grounds by Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317 (2000).

arbitrary dismissal in an employee handbook, the employer is obligated to act in
accordance with those promises. 18 The court explained:
[T]he employer's act in issuing an employee policy manual can lead to
obligations that govern the employment relationship. . . . While an employer need
not establish personnel policies or practices, where an employer chooses to establish
such policies and practices and makes them known to its employees, the
employment relationship is presumably enhanced. The employer secures an orderly,
cooperative and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated
with job security and the conviction that he will be treated fairly.... Therefore, we
hold that if an employer, for whatever reason, creates an atmosphere of job security
and fair treatment with promises of specific treatment in specific situations and an
employee is induced thereby to remain on the job and not actively seek other
employment, those promises are enforceable components of the employment
relationship.19
Unlike the tort and implied covenant approaches, the implied contract exception to
the at-will rule applies to an employer’s personnel policies that are communicated to an
employee at the time of hire. As a result of the implied contract exception, many employers
who made promises of job security either explicitly in their employment handbooks or
implicitly in their corporate cultures found themselves bound by them when they tried to
dismiss long-term workers.20 However, because the job security term is deemed to be
contractual in origin, courts have found that it is a term that can be waived. Thus
increasingly, employers make disclaimers, so that today, most employer manuals and other
forms today inform employees in unambiguous terms that their employer is at-will and
that the employer has the right to dismiss them at any time.21
18

Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash.,1984).

19

Id. at 1087-89.
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Some of the other cases in which courts have found and enforced an implied contract for longterm employment are: Fletcher v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 585 F. Supp. 1260, 1263–64 (D. Kan.
1984); Salimi v. Farmers Ins. Group, 684 P.2d 264, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.,
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21 Max Schanzenbach, Exceptions to At-Will Employment, 5 Am. L. & Econ. J. 470, 478 & n.3 (2003).

In addition to the changing common law of employment dismissal, in the 1970s and
1980s many state legislatures and the federal government enacted laws that mandated
certain individual employees rights as part of their employment relationship. There have
long been laws establishing a mandatory minimum wage, overtime pay, social security,
unemployment insurance, and workers compensation. But in the 1970s and 80s, state
legislatures added new mandatory terms, many of which involved job security protections
for individual employees. For example, twenty-two states make it unlawful to dismiss an
employee in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim.22 Thirty-four states have
given legislative protection for whistle-blowers, and forty-two states
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regulate the administration of employment-related lie detector tests.23 The state of
Montana has adopted a Comprehensive Unjust Dismissal law that gives workers some
protection against wrongful dismissal.24

IV. Changes to Dismissal Law in Action
The developments discussed above all involve the imposition of terms on the at-will
relationship that give employees protection against unjust dismissal, thereby transforming
the at-will employment contract into a contract with fixed rights and obligations.
However, there has been another development in recent years that has had the opposite
effect on employment contracts. Beginning in the late 1980s, human resource theorists and
consultants urged firms to abandon long term employment relationships and adopt instead
a free agency model of employment. Whereas in the past many employers masked the de
jure at-will contract of employment by a de facto implicit regime of long-term attachment
and job security, today employers are reverting to the stark at-will regime that has ere
been lurking in the shadows.
In addition, employers are increasingly using non-permanent employees such as
temporary employees and independent contractors who never had an implicit promise of
long-term employment. These trends signify an important change in the de facto nature of
the employment contract – a retreat from long-term relationships and the rise of a free
agency model in employment. As a result, employers have dismantled their internal labor
market job structures and abandoned the implicit promises that went along with them.25
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In its place, employers are creating new types of employment relationships which do not
depend upon, or encourage, longevity. Employers make these changes in order to gain the
flexibility to cross-utilize employees and make quick adjustments in production methods as
they confront increasingly competitive product markets.
The trends toward flexibility are described in more detail below. Taken together
they signify an important change in the de facto nature of the employment contract.
Throughout most of the twentieth century, large employers implicitly promised employees
long-term employment contracts despite the de jure regime of the at will contract.
However, the new employment practices signify a retreat from long-term contracts and
rise of free agency model, a return to the at will regime and the re-casualization of work.

1. The Changing Employment Contract of the Regular Employee
In the late twentieth century, employers began to dismantle their internal labor
market job structures. Facing rapidly expanding and increasingly competitive global
product markets, they began to create new types of employment relationships that
provided them the flexibility to make quick adjustments in production methods, product
design, marketing strategies, and product mixes. To respond to intense global competition,
firms needed the ability to decrease or redeploy their work force quickly as market
opportunities shifted. Hence management theorists and industrial relations specialists
developed what they call the “new psychological contract,”26 or the “new deal at work.”27 In
the new deal, the long-standing assumption of long-term attachment between an employee and a single firm has broken down. It has been replaced by other

implicit and explicit understandings of the mutual obligations of employees and the firms that employ them.

26 See e.g., Sandra L. Robinson & Denise M. Rousseau, Violating the Psychological Contract: Not the Exception But the Norm, 15 Journal Organizational Behavior 245, 246
(1994)

; Neil Anderson & René Schalk, The Psychological Contract in Retrospect and Prospect, 19 Journal

Organizational Behavior 637, 637 (1998); Marcie A. Cavanaugh & Raymond A. Noe, Antecedents and
Consequences of Relational Components of the New Psychological Contract, 20 J. Organizational Behav.
323, 323 (1999).
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Peter Cappelli, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN WORK FORCE 217 (1999).

While the new employment relationship does not depend upon long-term
employment, attachment, or mutual loyalty between the employee and the firm, it also does
not dispense with the need for engaged and committed employees. Indeed, firms today
believe that they need the active engagement of their employees more than ever before.
They want not merely predictable and excellent role performance -- they want employees
to commit their imagination, energies, and intelligence on behalf of their firm. Thus they
seek to elicit behavior that goes beyond specific roles and job demands, and gives the firm
something extra. Organizational theorists characterize this something extra as
organizational citizenship behavior, or “OCB.”28
Much of current human resource policy is designed to resolve the following
paradox: Firms need to motivate employees to provide the OCB and the commitment to
quality, productivity, and efficiency while at they same time they are dismantling the job
security and job ladders that have given employees a stake in the well-being of their firms
for the past 100 years. Hence managers have been devising new organizational structures
that embody flexibility while also promoting promote skill development and fostering
organizational citizenship behavior.
A new employment relationship is emerging through such theoretical and
experimental programs as total quality management (TQM), competency-based
organizations, and high performance work practice programs.29 Despite differences in
emphasis, the various approaches that comprise the new employment relationship share
several common features.30 First, employers no longer implicitly offer employees long term
job security. Rather they explicitly disavowing a promise of job security. In its stead,
28 See Dennis W. Organ, ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR: THE GOOD SOLDIER SYNDROME 4-5 (1988).
29 See, Edward E. Lawler, III, THE ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE: CREATING THE HIGH-INVOLVEMENT ORGANIZATION,at 156 (1992) (on compntency based organizations). See Joshua G.
Rosett & Richard N. Rosett, Characteristics of TQM (NBER Working Paper No. 7241, 1999); Eric E. Anschutz, TQM AMERICA (1995) (on Total Quality Managemenet). See
generally, Stone, The New Psychological Contract, 48 UCLA L. Rev. at 565-568.
30 Mark Roehling et al., The Nature of the New Employment Relationship(s): A Content Analysis of the Practitioner and Academic Literatures 2 (Ctr. for Advanced Human Res.
Studies, Working Paper No. 98-18, 1998).

employers give their employees implicit promises and understandings “employability
security” – i.e. opportunities to develop their human capital so they can prosper in the
external labor market.31
Another feature of the new employment relationship is that it emphasizes the value
of the worker’s intellectual and cognitive contribution to the firm. Unlike scientific
management that attempted to diminish or eliminate the role of workers’ knowledge in the
production process, today’s management theories attempt to increase employee knowledge
and harness their knowledge on behalf of the firm.32
The new employment relationship involves compensation systems that peg salaries
and wages to market rates rather than internal institutional factors. The emphasis is on
offering employees differential pay to reflect differential talents and contributions. It also
involves firms giving employees contact with the firm’s constituents in order to get them to
be familiar with and focused on the firm’s competitive needs, and at the same to raise the
employees’ social capital so that they can find job elsewhere. Hence firms today are
encouraged to provide employees with opportunities to interact with a firm’s customers,
suppliers and even competitors. The new relationship also involves a flattening of
hierarchy and the elimination of status-linked perks.33
An important feature of the new relationship is a new emphasis on procedural
justice at work.34 Researchers have found that employees who perceive their employer as
unfair reduce their OCB, triggering a downward cycle in which the employees’ diminished
OCB leads the supervisor to withdraw informal types of affirmation, causing the employee
31 ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, E-VOLVE 192 (2001).
32 THOMAS A. STEWART, INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: THE NEW WEALTH OF ORGANIZATIONS, at ix (1997); THOMAS

O. DAVENPORT, HUMAN
CAPITAL: WHAT IT IS AND WHY PEOPLE INVEST IN IT 152-56 (1999).
33 See Janice Klein, The Paradox of Quality Management: Commitment, Ownership, and Control, in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION, 178 - 182 (Charles Heckscher,&
Anne Donnellon, eds. 1994).

34 See JERALD GREENBERG, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE ON THE JOB 32–39 (1996). See generally, Jason Colquitt, et. al., Justice at the Millenium: At Meta-Analytic Review of 25 years
of Organizational Justice Research, 86 J. of App. Psych. 425, 435-36 (2001).

to experience additional feelings of unfairness and to further decrease her OCB.35
Accordingly, employers have attempted to devise procedures fostering a perception of fair
treatment. They have instituted a wide range of dispute resolution procedures designed to
address employee complaints including open door policies, ombudsmen, management
appeals boards, peer review, mediation, and arbitration.36
It is understandable that employees would demand some procedural fairness when
they lack promises of long-term employment because in this new employment relationship,
employees are required to bear many of the risks that were previously borne by the firm.
Because employees increasingly have to bear the consequences of firm failure or market
fluctuations, they at least want to be confident that the incidence of the risks are fairly
applied.
One result of the new employment relationship is that employees today expect to
have a series of employment experiences, sometimes as regular employees, sometimes as
temporary workers, and sometimes as independent contractors. Another result is that
employees expect benefits other than job security from their jobs. They expect to have an
opportunity to learn portable skills, to network with clients and competitors, and to gain
knowledge and experience that will help them manage their own careers and thrive in the
new boundaryless workplace. And they also expect fair treatment at work.
2. The Employment Contract of the Atypical Worker
Just as the employment contract for “regular” employees is changing, there has also
been an explosion in new types of workers who are not “employees” in any conventional
sense. A survey of firms in all industries and of all sizes conducted by the Upjohn Institute

35 See Dennis W. Organ, ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR: THE GOOD SOLDIER SYNDROME 76–77 & 162 (1988). See also S. Robinson et al., Changing Obligations, 37
Acad. Mgmt. J. 137, 149 (1994) (finding that citizenship may result from employees’ perceptions of the company’s performance of its obligations under the psychological
contract).
36 See Lisa B. Bingham & Denise R. Chachere, Dispute Resolution in Employment: The Need for Research, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION,, at 103–13 (A. Eaton & J.
Keefe, eds., 2000) (discussing the growth of ombudsmen, mediation, and arbitration programs amongst nonunion firms); Alexander James Colvin,, Institutional Pressures, Human
Resource Strategies, and the Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution, 56 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 375 (2003) (discussing the development of peer review, open door policies,
management appeal boards, mediation, and arbitration at TRW in the 1990s).

found that 78 per cent of all private firms used some sorts of flexible staffing
arrangements.37 Atypical workers – temporary workers, leased workers, part-time
workers, trainees and apprentices, and “dependent” independent contractors – are a
growing portion of the labor force. In 2005, the Department of Labor classified 16.2 million
people – 12.1 per cent of the workforce – as contingent workers. Of these, there were an
estimated 10.3 million independent contractors. 2.5 million on-call workers, 1.2 million
temporary help agency workers, and 813,000 workers for contract work companies out of a
total full time workforce of 139 million.38 In addition, in 2003 the Department of Labor
found that there were over five million involuntary part-time workers – those who want
but do not have regular employment.39
Atypical workers are workers without employers. Some work under at-will
employment contracts and some have no employment contracts at all. Temporary workers
move from firm to firm, often dispatched for short term assignments by a temporary help
agency. On-call workers are either retained by a specific employer to work on an asneeded basis, or placed on-call by a temporary help agency are required to be available for
work without knowing their next place or hours of work. “Independent contractors” have
none of the rights of employees, even though they often resemble employees in every
respect. Many are unskilled workers who face shape-ups in ad hoc hiring halls on street
corners every morning.40 Neither atypical workers nor independent contractors have a
reasonable expectation of long term employment with a particular employer, even though
they can spend years in the labor force doing the same kind of work in the same geographic
37 Susan Houseman, Why Employers Use Flexible Staffing Arrangements, 55 Indus. & Labor Rels. Rev. 149 (Oct. 2001).
38 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent and Alternative Work Arrangements – February, 2005 (USDL 05-1433, Gov’t Printing Office, July 27, 2005).
See also, Sharon R. Coheny, Workers in Alternative Working Arrangements, 4-6 Monthly Labor Rev. Nov. 1998.

39 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, A Profile of the Working Poor, 2003, Table 1, p. 6 (Gov’t Printing Office, Report 983, March, 2005). See also, Chris Tilly,
HALF A JOB: BAD AND GOOD PART-TIME JOBS IN A CHANGING LABOR MARKET (Temple University Press, 1996). Writing in 1996, Rebecca Blank estimated that between 4.6 and 8.5
per cent of the workforce is in contingent or part-time work involuntarily and would prefer regular, full time employment instead. See Rebecca M. Blank, Contingent Work in a
Changing Labor Market, in GENERATING JOBS, (Richard Freeman and Peter Gottschalk, eds. 1998).

40 See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOP (2005).

area. Atypical workers receive significantly less pay than their regular employee
counterparts and are less likely to receive health insurance or pensions from their
employers. They also have very limited rights under the labor laws.41

V: The Contract of Employment for Workers in the United States Today
One important aspect of employment practices in the United States today is that
employers today desire to impose terms of employment that extend beyond the life of the
at-will contract, and courts are acquiescing. One clause that employers now frequently
include in employment contracts bears directly on job security – arbitration clauses for
nonunion workers. The use of arbitration in non-union employmenet received a major
boost from the 1991 Supreme Court decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,42
There the Supreme Court held that an employer could require an employee to bring
charges of unlawful age discrimination to the employer’s own private arbitration system
rather than to a court. Since 1991, the lower federal courts have interpreted Gilmer
expansively to mandate arbitration of nonunion employees' claims involving allegations of
race, sex, religion, and national origin discrimination, as well as claims arising under the
ERISA, and the federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act.43
In the wake of the Gilmer decision, employers frequently require employees to agree
to a pre-dispute arbitration procedure as a condition of employment. Indeed, nonunion
arbitration is one of the fastest growing human resource practice in the United States. A
study by the General Accounting Office in the late 1990s found that approximately 10 per

41 See, Katherine V.W. Stone, Employment Rights for Atypical Employees, ___ Berkeley J. of Empl. & Lab. Law ___ (2006); Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of
Workplace Regulation: A Historical and Comparative Perspective on Contingent Work, 24 Berkeley J. of Emp. & Lab. Law 153, 164 (2003); Patricia Ball, The New Traditional
Employment Relationship, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 901, 909-913 (2003).

42

. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

43 See, e.g., Maye v. Smith, Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (race discrimination); Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76 (D. Mass. 1993)
(pregnancy discrimination); Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (race, sex, and religious discrimination; Albert v. NCR Co., 874 F. Supp.
1328 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (sex, race, and national origin discrimination); Pritzker v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993) (ERISA); Saari v. Smith,
Barney, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1992) (polygraph protection).

cent of American workers were covered by such compulsory arbitration agreements, and
employers of another 8 percent are intending to institute them.44 Indeed, the number of
workers covered by nonunion arbitration has surpassed the number covered by union
contracts, and it is still growing.
The use of nonunion mandatory arbitration is a major change in the civil justice
system for employment disputes in the United States. The 1970s and 80s were a time when
individual workers obtained an unprecedented number of legal rights from legislatures
and courts - rights against unjust dismissal, protection of privacy on the job, rights against
employment discrimination, and so forth.45 As a result of Gilmer, the 1990s became a
decade in which workers’ rights were often relegated to employer-crafted arbitration
tribunals for their enforcement. The shift from courts to private tribunals for enforcement
of rights has de facto deprived workers of many of the benefits of the new-found antidiscrimination and job security protections because employer-crafted arbitration systems
typically are designed to make it difficult for workers to prevail and to reduce the awards
in the cases in which they do.46
In recent years, the Gilmer decision has come under intense attack. Many scholars
and labor relations experts have argued that employment arbitration systems fall far short
of the due process protections that one would expect from a court. For example, they often
contain features such as raising the employees’ burdens of proof, limiting her ability to call
witnesses, eliminating the possibility of discovery, or preventing arbitrators from awarding
punitive or compensatory damages. Also, courts have required employees to arbitrate in
cases in which they not only failed to agree to arbitrate future employment disputes, but
44 General Accounting Office, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, GAO/HEHS-95-150 Employment
Discrimination (1995).
45 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59
CHI. L. REV. 575 (1992).

46 See, Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENVER UNIV. L. REV. 1017, 1034
(1996) (Stone, “Yellow Dog Contract”).

were not personally notified that the employer had such a policy.47 And under established
American arbitration law, the decisions of arbitrators are almost impossible to appeal.48
The use of nonunion arbitration clauses marks a significant but sub silentio retreat
from the extreme at-will form of the employment contract. By requiring employees to
accept an arbitration system as a pre-condition for employment, employers are effectively
requiring employees to waive their employment rights. They are also imposing a term on
the employment contract that lives beyond the moment to moment nature of the at-will
relationship. Indeed, the arbitration lives beyond the life of the employment altogether.

VI. Conclusion
As we have seen, the employment contract in the United States is undergoing a
significant transformation despite the fact that it has been, and remains, nominally at-will.
Courts and legislatures are weaving job security rights out of common law and public
policy threads. But as fast as these rights are woven by day, they are unwoven at night by
employers, who like Homer’s Penelope, are attempting to avoid attachments in order to
preserve their freedom. That is, employers’ new employment practices are emerging in
spite of and sometimes in response to the changes in the judicial and legislative
modifications to at-will employment. By restructuring their employment practices, firms
avoid giving their employees any de facto or de jure longevity rights.
At the same time, we have seen that employers today desire to impose terms of
employment that extend beyond the life of the at-will contract, and courts are acquiescing.
Ironically, the judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses signifies a significant retreat
from the extreme at-will form of the employment contract, and it raises the question

47 Id. For example, in Lang v. Burlington Northern RR Co., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993) an employer adopted an arbitration policy unilaterally and notified its employees
by mail. The court enforced the policy despite the fact that the employee who brought a legal action claimed never to have received any notice, no less agree to be bound by the
procedure.

48 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 North Carolina Law Rev. 931(1999).

whether other terms can be imported into the contract of employment and bind parties
over time. The question of which new terms should be imported requires serious
consideration.
In other writing, I have argued that courts should impose terms that are attendant
to the new set of expectations that employers have created in the wake of their repudiation
of job security. Thus, for example, I have argued that if employers implicitly promise
employees an opportunity to gain valuable knowledge and develop one’s human capital on
the job, then courts should rebuff employers’ efforts to enforce restrictive covenants when
doing so would negate that promise.49

Similarly, when employers promise employees fair

treatment and require employees to utilize an in-house arbitration system, then courts
should scrutinize those procedures to make sure that the treatment is in fact fair and that
the arbitration system adequately protects their rights.50
I would go further, and also contend that courts should impose other implied terms
and obligations of the new employment relationship. Just as some courts enforced the
implied term of job security in the at-will employment contracts of the 1980s and 90s even
in the absence of an express implied-in-fact promise, I would suggest that courts today
imply other terms into the contract of employment – terms to ensure workers with
training, retraining, employability, networking, and transition assistance.
Furthermore, courts should impose onto the contract of employment a “right of fair
treatment,” a right that inheres in all employment relationships regardless of what kind of
treatment has been promised. Such a right would extend beyond those termed
“employees” to all who perform work for an employer. It would obviate the factually
dense problem of ascertaining the implicit and explicit promises of the employment
relationship, and would also extend protection to atypical employees and dependent
49 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work, 34 Conn. L. Rev.721 (2002).
50 Katherine V.W. Stone, Dispute Resolution in the Boundaryless Workplace, 16 Ohio St. J. of Disp. Resol. 467 (2001).

independent contractors. A right of fair treatment is already embodied in many of today’s
human resource approaches, so to create such a right would track existing practices in
many cases. The right of fair treatment I propose should be an implied term that reflects
the vulnerabilities that the new workplace has shifted onto workers and the need for new
types of social protection. While it would obviously require elaboration on a case-by-case
basis, the creation of such a right would go a long way toward bringing fairness to the
labor market.

